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distinction in a principled way after all; or they suggest
that, at least, Boonin-Vail has not shown that Carruthers
cannot have his distinction in a principled way.
The first distinction is between public and private
animal suffering. Carruthers accepts that contractors
would agree to prohibit public exhibitions of acts that
cause animal suffering, but he holds that they would
not agree to prohibit acts with similar consequences,
so long as they were done out of the public view.
Boonin-Vail does not believe that this distinction can
be maintained. He argues that a contractor who would
object to having to witness the kicking of a dog would
also object to factory fanning, no matter how hidden.
This seems immensely plausible, perhaps because
in general, the morality of an action is not affected by
whether others know about it. But if we hew austerely
to contractualism, as the terms of Boonin-Vail's critique
require us to do, then I believe that we can make a
distinction at the place where Carruthers needs it. To
do this, an analogy will be helpful. So, let us consider
the extreme reaction that some people have to the sight
of their own blood. This reaction can unnerve them to
the point of interfering with tending to their injury. The
key point is that this emotional reaction can take place,
even when they are well aware that their injury is quite
superficial and therefore not dangerous at all. This
shows that we can separate the emotional reaction due
to actual confrontation (which is great in this case) from
the reaction one might have to the mere thought of
something (which would be mild in the absence of the
confrontation). Armed with this distinction, we can
imagine that contractors might agree to rules that enable
them to avoid confrontation with upsetting scenes, but
not to rules that prohibit activities that do not risk
causing such confrontations.
Boonin-Vail makes a perfectly natural move here
by replying, in effect, that contractors will also want to
avoid the distress of having to think about what goes
on behind the walls of the confinement building. But
here is where I need to make the essential point of my
criticism of tllis case: This reply seems so natural
because we are apt to imagine contractors as having a
moral repugnance to factory farming and not wishing
to have to suffer with the thought that this immoral
activity is being tolerated. But contractors cannot be in
this frame of mind. Moral judgments depend on the
outcome of the contractors' deliberations, and therefore
cannot enter into their deliberations behind the veil of
ignorance. If we are careful to take account of this point,
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In this paper, Professor Boon in-Vail has made many
points that we must certainly attend to in our efforts
to identify the proper relation between ourselves and
animals. He has also raised questions about the results
of contract theory that may lead some to skepticism
about its usefulness as a tool in applied ethics. The
justifiability of such skepticism is a large question that
I shall not try to resolve. For, fortunately for me,
Boonin-Vail has made my job as commentator much
easier than that. He has done so by setting himself a
task that is extremely difficult. His approach is to
concede, for the sake of the argument, a great deal to
Carruthers, and then to show that, even with the
concessions, he can force Carruthers into a number of
dilemmas, in which Carruthers must either settle for
less than he claims, or concede more than he allows.
My comments will be confined to the narrow question
of whether Boonin- Vail has succeeded in hoisting
Carruthers with his own petard.
Boonin-Vail considers three main arguments. In each
case, there is some distinction at stake. If Carruthers
can make the distinction in a principled way, then he
can satisfy common intuitions about treatment of
animals for cases on one side of the distinction, while
refusing to extend that treatment to cases on the other
side of the distinction. However, if he cannot make the
distinction in a principled way, then he must either give
up the common intuition, or allow for the extension to
a wider class of cases than he wishes. It will be
convenient, therefore, to think of Boonin- Vail as arguing
that certain distinctions are not available to Carruthers
in a principled way. Correlatively, the critical points I
shall make all have one of two forms. They either
suggest how Carruthers might be able to make the
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then we have only the avoidance of the emotional charge
involved in direct confrontation to worry about; and
this is taken care of by a prohibition that draws the line
where Carruthers wants it, I.e., between public and
nonpublic cases. l
Boonin- Vail may reply that even the distress of
thinking about factory farm animal pain without any
moral suppositions would be believed by contractors
to be enough to take steps to avoid. I have not proved
that this isn't so. I do think, however, that we need more
argument to convince us, since there does seem to be a
general rule that what is done out of sight is far less
distressing that what we cannot avoid seeing.
Let us turn to the second argument. This centers on
the idea that contractors might agree to prohibit
mistreatment of animals from a motive of cruelty,
because they worry that people who have a habit of
disregarding animal suffering will be insensitive to pain
in other humans. Carruthers wishes to allow this
consideration to have some force, but regards this force
as limited. To draw this limit, he needs to distinguish
between knowingly causing pain in animals from a
motive of cruelty and knowingly causing pain in animals
as a result of activities that stem from other motives. I
have been unable to find a perfectly satisfactory way
of abbreviating the arms of this distinction, but one is
surely needed and I have adopted the pair: brutality and
indifference. Using these abbreviations, we can state
Carruthers' position this way: Contractors have
something significant to fear from people who exhibit
brutality and they will therefore agree to rules that
discourage it; but they have little or nothing to worry
about from those who are merely indifferent, so they
will not agree to rules that discourage mere indifference.
Factory farming involves indifference, but not brutality.
Therefore, contractors will not agree to rules that would
prohibit factory farming.
Boonin-Vail seeks to undercut this distinction. There
are more points made than I can review in detail, but
the general direction is this. First, let us distinguish
between nontrivial indifference and trivial indifference.
Nontrivial indifference, as I shall understand it, occurs
when the motive for the action that produces animal
pain is nontrivial; trivial indifference occurs when the
motive is trivial. Briefly, but correctly to the best of my
belief, Boonin-Vail's thought is that, while nontrivial
indifference may be pardonable, trivial indifference is
a serious moral flaw, which contractors would agree to
avoid for the same reason they would want to avoid
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brutality. Factory farming involves trivial indifference;
therefore, contractors would prohibit it. Remember that
trivial indifference does not mean a low degree of
indifference, or indifference to a trivial amount of
suffering; it means that the motives of the action are
trivial. The motives for factory farming are trivial,
argues Boonin-Vail, because, again very briefly, there
are equally satisfactory alternatives that will not produce
comparable suffering and will enable humans to satisfy
their needs.
This seems very plausible, because indifference to
suffering is a serious moral flaw. Unfortunately,
however, it is not legitimate to introduce this plain fact
into the contractors' deliberations. We must not say, as
Boonin-Vail does, that "the question which the rational
contractors behind the veil of ignorance must face is
precisely whether it would be best that this be the sort
of world in which they live" unless it is clear that moral
considerations are excluded from what is meant by the
"best." We should not represent contractors as interested
in "moral superiority" (as Boonin-Vail does). The reason
is the same as before: What is moral is not determinate
until after the contractors have finished agreeing.
If we adhere austerely to the contractualist point of
view, we must consider only this question: Would
contractors believe that they have as much to fear from
people whose characters have been influenced by
engaging in factory farming as they do from those
whose characters have been influenced by a general
acceptance of brutality toward animals? This is a
psychological question for which psychological
evidence would be appropriate. I do not think that
Boonin-Vail has established that it is reasonable to
suppose that the two cases are at all comparable; and
so, I do not think he has established that contractors
would be likely to treat them similarly. I have not, of
course, disproved the claim that the cases are similar in
their character effects, nor can I do so. However,
although I have no evidence for this whatsoever, I
nonetheless suspect that there are factory farmers who
treat their hunting dogs extremely well and who would
not tolerate their children's acting otherwise. This makes
me think that the psychology of factory farmers is
probably quite different from the psychology of adults
who, say, severely beat their animals.
A further argument in Boonin-Vail's second section
concerns consumers of the products of factory farming.
I believe that this raises issues that are similar to the
ones just reviewed. In the interest of time, therefore, let
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us pass on to the most important of Boonin- Vail's
arguments, the one that concludes that Carruthers cannot
maintain a distinction between the moral status accorded
to animals and that accorded to marginal humans.
Boonin-Vail's case here is immensely plausible. I shall
try to restate its essential structure very briefly. Let us
start with a key distinction to which CarruUlers appeals.
On the one hand, the regard that we are to have toward
animals or marginal humans after the veil is lifted is
direct, that is, harms to them are to be regarded as wrong
in themselves, not merely instrumentally wrong. On the
other hand, the justification is indirect: When contractors
are behind the veil, they will be considering only the
instrumental value to themselves of adopting this or that
rule. Now, Boonin-Vail's point can be glossed as follows:
If we stay behind the veil, the kind of justification that
we have for our regard for animals is of the same kind as
the justification that we have for our regard for marginal
humans (namely, indirect). And, if we lift the veil, then
the regard we are to have for animals is of the same kind
as the regard we are to have for humans (nanlely, direct).
In both cases, there is no principled distinction between
the situation regarding animals and the situation regarding
marginal humans. We can get what looks like a principled
distinction by taking the post-veil lifting point of view
for one case and Ule pre-veil lifting point of view for the
other; but, of course, that is cheating. (Besides, if we
allowed comparison from the different points of view,
we could come out with animals having a fuller status
Ulan marginal humans!)
NoneUleless, I believe that there is a way of sailing
between the Scylla of over-regard for animals and the
Charybdis of under-regard for marginal humans. This
way is to agree that in both cases we have indirect
justifications for direct attitudes of regard but to hold
that what I shall call the content of those direct attitudes
may differ. The best way I can Ulink of to make this
clear is to imagine two different rules that contractors
behind the veil might propose to be adopted and instilled
in their children as fundamental principles. Of course,
as Uley are still behind Ule veil, Uley preface each
proposal with Ule statement that, as rational agents, Uley
all ought to agree to promote Ule rule being offered
because its adoption is in Uleir interest. But WHAT Uley
propose is different in each case. Namely, Uley propose
for adoption,

(A) Cruelty to animals for no further purpose is
intrinsically evil.
Despite Ule fact Ulat Ulese rules both embody a direct
attitude and have the same (indirect) kind of
justification, they differ in what they enjoin. For
example, (H) disallows termination of life, (painless)
castration, and use in medical experiments; (A) does
not disallow any of these, so long as they are done
without unnecessary pain. There is therefore a sense in
which (H) accords full moral standing to marginal
humans, while (A) does not accord full moral standing
to animals. 2
I have not, of course, proved that principles (H) and
(A) are principles that contractors would adopt. My
conclusion is only that we have not been shown that
things could not turn out Ulis way; and, if they did,
animals would have some intrinsic moral status, but
not full moral standing.
As I implied at the outset, I do not think Ule upshot
of these remarks will be that everyone will want to go
out and become a contractualist. Nonetheless, I do think
that if one does adopt contractualism, it may be more
defensible than Boonin-Vail believes.

Notes
1 I add two ca~es that I take to support the point here, and
that may come up in discussion, but that I don't think I will
have time to read.

I. Homosexuality case. A person could think that gay
rights ought to be protected, but still dislike
witnessing two men kissing. (For that matter, a
heterosexual person could feel uncomfortable at
witnessing pUblic displays of heterosexual
affection.) So, I think there's a big difference
between the distress one might have at witnessing
homosexual acts and the distress one might have at
contemplating them-Le., since one of these
reactions can occur without the other, their sources
are different even when both are present. Further,
the only reason I can see for being distressed by
private sexual acts, that is, acts where the witnessing
is absent, depends on the belief that they are
immoral; which, as I've said in the text, is not
something we can legitimately introduce if we hew
to the contractualist background assumption.
2. Erotophiles like explicit, erotic photographs;
erotophobes dislike seeing them. My friends in
psychology tell me there are both kinds of people.
We can easily imagine an erotophile who thinks

(H) Marginal humans intrinsically possess Ule same
human rights as normal humans, and
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"I'd be a better person if I weren't turned on by
these pictures; after all, the personalities, which are
what really ought to count in eroticism, are not
represented." We can also imagine an erotophobe
who thinks 'These are natural human activities, I
would be a better person if I related more positively
to this material." That is, morality may crosscut the
witnessing reaction. Again, it is only the analogue
of the witnessing reaction that is properly included
in the contractors' deliberations.
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I take the general thesis of Professor Robinson's
comments to be this: in conceding so much to Carruthers
for the sake of the argument, I have provided the
contractarian with sufficient grounds on which to
overcome the initially plausible-looking objections I
have raised (or at least I have failed to show that I
haven't provided such grounds). In keeping with the
spirit of his comments, then, I will limit myself here to
the narrow question of whether Robinson has succeeded
in hoisting me not so much with my own petard, as
with the one I have tentatively accepted on loan from
the contractarian.

2 The question arises whether the suggested way of
maintaining a distinction between the cases of animals and
marginal humans can be attributed to Carruthers. It is true
that he does not crisply distinguish content of principies from
type of justification and type of attitude that goes with them.
Nonetheless, I think (but shall not argue in any detail) that
my discussion is quite in accord with Carruthers' views. I
note that in P. Carruthers, The Animals Issue (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1992), the pages from 110 to
118, which deal mostly with marginal humans, are filled with
talk about rights. The section on animals and character (pp.
153-156) is, by contrast, focused upon cruelty and sympathy.
A notable exception occurs near the beginning of p. 154. Here,
however, the kind of wrongness that cruelty to animals has,
and that is to be further discussed in this section, is explicitly
contrasted with Violation of rights.

I.
My first argument maintained that if the contracting
agents would decide to avoid the risk of being distressed
by the sight of animals suffering for trivial reasons in
public, then they would also decide to avoid the risk of
being distressed by their knowledge that animals are
suffering for trivial reasons in private. Robinson's
objection, I think, can best be summarized in the form
of a dilemma: either I am relying on there being a moral
aversion to this suffering, in which case I am reneging
on my commitment to argue the issue on the
contractarian's own terms, or I am appealing to a
nonmoral aversion, in which case I have failed to
account for the fact that, in general, what is done out of
sight is less emotionally distressing than what is done
in full view.
I will focus on the first hom of the dilemma and
make a brief comment about the second. With respect
to the first, I think that there is a way for me to appeal
to the existence of a moral aversion to private animal
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